Abstract. We present an approach to veri cation that combines the strengths of model-checking and theorem proving. We use theorem proving to show a bisimulation up to stuttering on a|potentially in nite-state|system. Our characterization of stuttering bisimulation allows us to do such proofs by reasoning only about single steps of the system. We present an on-the-y method that extracts the reachable quotient structure induced by the bisimulation, if the structure is nite. If our speci cation is a temporal logic formula, we model-check the quotient structure. If our speci cation is a simpler system, we use an equivalence checker to show that the quotient structure is stuttering bisimilar to the simpler system. The results obtained on the quotient structure lift to the original system, because the quotient, by construction, is re ned by the original system. We demonstrate our methodology by verifying the alternating bit protocol. This protocol cannot be directly model-checked because it has an in nite-state space; however, using the theorem prover ACL2, we show that the protocol is stuttering bisimilar to a small nite-state system, which we model-check. We also show that the alternating bit protocol is a re nement of a non-lossy system.
Introduction
We propose an approach to veri cation that combines the strengths of the model-checking CE81, QS82, CES86] and the automated theorem proving (e.g., BM79, GM93]) approaches. We use a theorem prover to reduce an in nite-state (or large nite-state) system to a nite-state system, which we then handle using automatic methods.
The reduction amounts to proving a stuttering bisimulation BCG88] that preserves properties of interest. Two states are stuttering bisimilar if they are equivalent up to nexttime free CTL properties (CTL nX). CTL nX can be used to state most properties of ? Manolios's research was supported in part by the Admiral B.R. Inman Centennial Chair in Computing Theory. Namjoshi's research was supported in part by NSF Grant CCR-9415496 and SRC Grant 97-DP-388. Sumners's research was supported in part by an AMD/SRC fellowship.
asynchronous systems (including fairness) and many timing-independent properties of synchronous hardware. Bisimulation|the usual notion of branching-time equivalence|is not appropriate when comparing systems at di erent levels of abstraction because a single step of the abstract system may correspond to many steps of the concrete system. Weak bisimulation Mil90] allows such comparisons, but does not preserve CTL nX properties.
We introduce well-founded equivalence bisimulation (WEB), a characterization of stuttering bisimulation that is based on well-founded bisimulation Nam97]. A proof that a relation is a WEB involves checking that each action of the program preserves the relation. Such single step proofs can be checked by theorem provers more readily than proofs based on the original de nition of stuttering bisimulation. A WEB induces a quotient structure that is equivalent (up to stuttering) with the original system. The idea is to check the quotient structure, but constructing the quotient structure can be di cult because determining if there is a transition between states in the quotient structure depends on whether there is a transition between some pair of related states in the original system (the number of such pairs may be in nite). Moreover, the quotient structure may be in nite-state, but the set of its reachable states may be nite. To address these two concerns, we introduce an on-the-y algorithm that for a large class of systems automatically extracts the quotient structure. Once the quotient structure is extracted, we can model-check it or we can use a WEB equivalence checker to compare it with another system.
We are interested in mechanical veri cation; by this we mean that every step in the proof of correctness (except for meta-theory and mechanical tools) is checked mechanically. The theorem prover we use is ACL2 KM97]. ACL2 is an extended version of the BoyerMoore theorem prover BM79]. ACL2 is based on a rst-order, executable logic of total recursive functions with induction. We have implemented a -calculus model checker with B uchi automata, a WEB equivalence checker, and the quotient extraction algorithm in ACL2; this allows us to perform all of the veri cation in ACL2 (this is possible because ACL2 is executable). The ACL2 les used are available upon request from the rst author.
We demonstrate our approach by verifying the alternating bit protocol BSW69]. We chose the alternating bit protocol because it has been used as a benchmark for veri cation e orts, and since this is the rst paper to use WEBs for verifying systems, it makes sense to compare our results with existing work. The alternating bit protocol has a simple description but lengthy hand proofs of correctness (e.g., BG94]), it is in nite-state, and its speci cation involves a complex fairness property. We have found it to be surprisingly difcult to verify mechanically; many previous papers verify various versions of the protocol (e.g., Mil90, CE81, HS96, BG96, MN95]), but all make simplifying assumptions, either by restricting channels to be bounded bu ers, by ignoring data, or by ignoring fairness issues.
In the next section, we discuss notation and present the theoretical background, including the de nitions of WEB, quotient structure, and re nement; related theorems are also presented. Due to space limitations, proofs of the theorems are omitted; they will appear in a future paper. We assume that the reader is familiar with the temporal logic CTL EH86]. In Section 3, we present the ACL2 formalization of the alternating bit protocol. In Section 4, we present the proof of correctness and in Section 5, we present concluding remarks and comparisons to other work. 
Quotient Extraction
We de ne a class of functions which we call \representative" functions. As we will see, representative functions allow us to extract nite quotient structures automatically.
De nition 4 (Representative Function)
Let M = hS; 99 K;L;I;APi be a TS and let B be a WEB on M, with well-founded witness hrank; hW; ii. all s 2 S; rep(9 9 K(s)) is nite and computable. We start by mapping I to rep(I) and then explore the state space, e.g., by a breadth rst traversal. Given a state, s, in the induced quotient structure (recall that s is also a state in the original structure), we compute the set rep(9 9 K(s)), which is the set of next states of s in the quotient structure. This process is repeated until no new states are generated. If the set of reachable quotient structure states is nite, the process will terminate. Note that the converse of the rst part of the theorem does not hold because AP may be a proper superset of AP 0 . Re nement in a branching-time framework corresponds to re ning atomicity in such a way that when the variables introduced for the re nement are hidden, the resulting system and the original system are WEB. Re nement depends crucially on stuttering Lam80] because we are comparing systems at di ering levels of abstraction and any reasonable correctness condition will not make assumptions about how long it takes for something to happen, i.e., the condition should be stuttering insensitive (i.e., the condition will not use X, the next-time temporal operator).
Protocol
The alternating bit protocol is used to implement reliable communication over faulty channels. We present the protocol from the view of the sender and receiver rst and then in complete detail. The sender interacts with the communication system via the register smsg and the ag svalid. The sender can assign a message to smsg provided it is invalid, i.e., svalid is false. The receiver interacts with the communication system via the register rmsg and the ag rvalid. The receiver can read rmsg provided it is valid, i.e., rvalid is The communication system consists of the ags s ag and r ag as well as the two lossy, unbounded, and FIFO channels s2r and r2s. The idea behind the protocol is that the contents of smsg are sent across s2r until an acknowledgment for the message is received on r2s, at which point a new message can be transmitted. Similarly, acknowledgments for a received message are sent across r2s until a new message is received. In order for the receiving end to distinguish between copies of the same message and copies of di erent messages, each message is tagged with s ag before being placed on s2r. When a new message is received, r ag is assigned the value of the message tag and gets sent across r2s; this also allows the sending end to distinguish acknowledgments. There may be an arbitrary number of copies of a message (or an acknowledgment) on the channels, and it turns out that there are at most two distinct messages (or acknowledgments) on the channels, hence binary ags su ce. Figure 2 depicts the protocol. 
Fig. 2. Alternating Bit Protocol
The above discussion is informal; a formal description follows, but rst we discuss notation. We have formalized the protocol and its proof in ACL2, however, for presentation purposes we describe the formalization using standard notation. We remain faithful to the ACL2 formalization, e.g., we do not use types: functions that appear typed are really under-speci ed, but total. The concatenation operator on sequences is denoted by \:", but sometimes we use juxtaposition; \ " denotes the empty sequence; head:s is the rst element of sequence s; tail:s is the sequence resulting from removing the rst element from s; jsj is the size of the sequence. Messages are pairs; info returns the rst component of a message and ag returns the second.
A state is an eight-tuple hs ag; svalid; smsg; s2r; r2s; r ag; rvalid; rmsgi; state is a predicate that recognizes states. The s ag of state s is denoted s ag:s and similarly for the other elds. Rules are functions from states into states; they are listed in Table 1 and are of the form G ! A; if A is used as a rule, it abbreviates true ! A. Rule We give an overview of the veri cation of the alternating bit protocol. ABP 00 is the alternating bit protocol, with some variables distorted. Let be the set of variables that are not distorted; then ABP and ABP 00 are -isomorphic. We de ne a relation B and prove that B is a WEB on ABP 00 . We de ne rep, a representative function on ABP 00 w.r.t. B.
We use our extraction procedure to extract the structure de ned by rep. ABP 0 is this structure, restricted to . We model-check ABP 0 ; by Theorem 4, ABP is a re nement of ABP 0 and any CTL nX formulae that hold on ABP 0 also hold on ABP.
We also show that ABP 0 is WEB to a non-lossy protocol; in many cases such a check is more convincing than model-checking because it shows that one system is a re nement of another.
Well-Founded Equivalence Bisimulation
In this subsection we de ne a relation B and outline the ACL2 proof that B is a WEB.
We start with some de nitions. The main idea behind the bisimulation is to relate states that have similar compressed channels|i.e., are equivalent under s2r-state and r2s-state|and are otherwise identical. We de ne the bisimulation in terms of rule rep : good-s2r:s2r ! s2r; r2s := s2r-state; r2s-state We now de ne our proposed WEB B: sBu i rep:s = rep:u. It is easy to see that B is an equivalence relation that, except for s2r and r2s, preserves the labeling of states. We de ne rank, a function on states as follows: rank:s = js2r:sj + jr2s:sj.
We will show that hrank; hN; <ii is a well-founded witness (to be pedantic we can de ne rank so that it has two arguments, as follows: rank:(u; s) = js2r:sj + jr2s:sj) Note that if sBw, sRu, and sBu, then uBw and by rule Skip, wRw, therefore, we need only concern ourselves with the case where :sBu. To show B is a WEB, it su ces to show: sBw^sRu^:sBu ) h9v : wRv : uBv _ (sBv^rank:v < rank:w)i We break up the proof (that B is a WEB) into the eight cases in Table 2 by expanding R, i.e., by considering all the ways in which s can be related to u. The cases have the Rule Lemma Accept:m sBw ) uBv Send-msg sBw^:sBu ) uBv Drop-msg sBw^:sBu ) (uBv) _ (sBv^rank:v < rank:w) Get-msg sBw^:sBu^u 6 = Drop-msg:s ) (uBv) _ (sBv^rank:v < rank:w) Send-ack sBw^:sBu ) uBv Drop-ack sBw^:sBu ) (uBv) _ (sBv^rank:v < rank:w) Get-ack sBw^:sBu^u 6 = Drop-ack:s ) (uBv) _ (sBv^rank:v < rank:w) Reply sBw ) uBv Table 2 . WEB case analysis form: Rule Lemma; when u or v appear in Lemma they abbreviate the terms Rule.s and Rule.w, respectively. We prove the cases in ACL2.
In order to tie up the case analysis, we de ne a function step that takes three states, s; u; and w; as arguments. If sBu, step returns w, else if u = A:s, for A, a rule from Table 1 , step returns A:w, else step returns w. Since we proved that B is an equivalence relation, the following theorem implies that B is a WEB (existential quanti cation is replaced by the witness function step): sBw^sRu^v = step:(s; u; w) ) wRv^(uBv _ (sBv^rank:v < rank:w))
Quotient Extraction
In this subsection we prove the following ACL2 theorems which show that rep is a representative function satisfying the requirements of Theorem 3; hence, the quotient structure induced by rep is isomorphic to the quotient structure w.r.t. B: sBw rep:s = rep:w, rep:rep:s = rep:s, and rank:rep:s rank:s. We extract the quotient structure (induced by rep) of the alternating bit protocol restricted to binary messages. In the following subsections, we describe the use of model-checking and WEB equivalence checking to analyze this structure. We now have enough machinery to describe how re nement is used in the verication of the alternating bit protocol. ABP is the model of the alternating bit protocol in ACL2. ABP 00 is ABP with s2r, r2s relabeled by s2r-state and r2s-state, respectively. B is a bisimulation on ABP 00 with well-founded witness hrank; hN; <ii, s.t. rank:(u; s) = js2r:f ?1 :sj + jr2s:f ?1 :sj (f is the bijection between ABP and ABP 00 ; recall that rank is de ned on states of ABP 00 ). The quotient structure of ABP 00 w.r.t. B is isomorphic to the structure induced by rep. ABP 0 is this structure, with s2r and r2s hidden. It is ABP 0 that we analyze in the next two subsections. By Theorem 4, ABP is a re nement of ABP 0 and properties of ABP 0 can be lifted to ABP.
Model-Checking
We model-check the quotient structure extracted by the above mentioned procedure, using a -calculus model-checker and a fair-CTL to -calculus translator, both written in ACL2.
We check the following formulae (written in CTL nX):
1. AG(sending1 ) A(sending1 W rmsg = 1)) 2. AG(receiving1 ) A(receiving1 W delivered1 )) 3. AGEFsvalid (acceptance of a new message is always eventually possible) where sending1 , receiving1 , and delivered1 are abbreviations for svalid^smsg = 1, rvalid^rmsg = 1, and :rvalid^rmsg = 1, respectively; formulae analogous to 1 and 2 are proved for message 0. All of the above formulae hold on the extracted structure, which is what one would expect. The property AGAFsvalid (acceptance of a new message is always eventually guaranteed), however, does not hold without further fairness assumptions.
The liveness properties are as follows. Each property is shown under a set of fairness assumptions on the actions of the process. These are either weak fairness (in nitely often disabled or in nitely often executed) or strong fairness (in nitely often enabled implies in nitely often executed). Since the fairness conditions mention actions, we compose B uchi automata accepting fair paths with the quotient structure and model-check the resulting structure on fair-CTL formulae which refer both to the propositions of the quotient structure and the accepting states of the automata.
We use an argument based on bisimulation to derive su cient conditions for dataindependence Wol86] of the protocol. These are veri ed in ACL2; as a consequence, the properties shown above for the data domain f0; 1g su ce to show similar properties for arbitrary data domains.
Bisimulation Checking
In many cases, the correctness proof is more convincing if we can show that the extracted model is bisimilar to a model that is so simple, it is correct by inspection. In the case of the alternating bit protocol, we can show that the extracted model is bisimilar to a simple, non-lossy version of the protocol, presented in Table 3 .
We use a WEB equivalence checker (based on the description in BCG88]) written in ACL2 to verify that the non-lossy protocol in Table 3 and the extracted protocol are WEB. The main idea is that we create the disjoint union of the transition systems corresponding to the extracted protocol and the non-lossy protocol. The algorithm will compute the coarsest WEB on a structure; hence, if the initial states of the two systems are in the same class, the two systems are WEB. In computing the coarsest WEB, we examine only svalid, smsg, rvalid, and rmsg. Notice that this view is exactly the one presented in Figure 1 . Among related work, MN95] prove safety properties of the alternating bit protocol by using Isabelle/HOL to prove that a manually constructed nite-state system contains all of the traces of the alternating bit protocol and then model-check the nite-state system. HS96] show the correctness of an in nite-state system by using PVS to verify that a simple manually constructed nite-state system is a conservative approximation of the in nitestate system. The work described in this paper improves upon such methods by (i) using a (veri ed) representative function to automatically construct a quotient structure, and (ii) using WEBs instead of simulations or trace containment: this allows us to check properties exactly, i.e., if a property holds (fails) on the simple system, then it holds (fails) on the original system. There are several known types of in nite-state systems (e.g., ACD90, GS92, AJ96, EN95]) for which the model-checking problem is decidable, but these types of systems often turn out to be too specialized for many cases where it is possible to devise nite abstractions. There have been several approaches to automatically verifying the alternating bit protocol: safety properties of such lossy channel systems are decidable AJ96]; however, in order to construct automatic abstractions that demonstrate liveness properties, most other veri cations of the alternating bit protocol (e.g., GS97]) consider channels to be bounded.
Mechanical veri cation is necessary. In our case, we managed to convince ourselves that a candidate relation was a WEB for the alternating bit protocol, even though it was not; this became clear only when we tried to prove it mechanically.
An interesting direction for future work is to apply the methodology presented here to the veri cation of other in nite-state systems (e.g., pipelined and out-of-order execution machines and memory coherence protocols).
